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For Europe, normalising al-Assad would be a political and moral disaster. It would send a clear message that dictators can commit war crimes, displace half their population, and still be welcomed back, Refik Hodžić writes.
As someone who witnessed the tragic consequences of conflict, genocide and forced displacement in the Balkans, every time an attempt is made to normalise relations with a dictator fuelling a decade-long war marked by repression, ethnic cleansing and major war crimes, it leaves me questioning who thought that would be anything but the worst possible idea.
Yet, Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani and his Austrian counterpart Alexander Schallenberg have just called for a change in Europe’s strategy toward Syria — specifically suggesting the normalisation of relations with the regime of Bashar al-Assad.
Their words, published in the Italian press, echo a call joined by six other countries —Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Greece, Slovakia, Slovenia and Croatia — facing increasing domestic political pressures to act against the increasing refugee flows toward Europe.
Their demands will be discussed in a meeting of all 27 EU member states on 13 September.
Informed by Bosnia’s painful history and years of work studying the Syrian crisis, I must warn that normalising relations with al-Assad would have disastrous consequences, especially in terms of refugee return and stability of Europe.
Legitimising a regime that has systematically destroyed its own population and which continues to pose a threat to both the Syrian people and European security will result in more refugees reaching European borders, not less.
The position articulated by the eight European governments seems to suggest that normalising relations with al-Assad could facilitate the return of Syrian refugees, thus easing the pressure on Europe.
This argument is fundamentally flawed. Syrian refugees are not simply economic migrants who can be coaxed back with promises of aid and reconstruction. They are people who fled unspeakable violence, torture, and repression at the hands of the al-Assad regime.
Any proposal to return refugees to Syria under al-Assad’s rule ignores the reality that many of these people are viewed as enemies by the very government that Europe seeks to normalise relations with.
Al-Assad’s regime has made it clear that it has no interest in welcoming back refugees, especially those who were part of the opposition or fled regime-controlled areas. The regime has enacted numerous laws that allow it to seize the properties of displaced Syrians, labelling them as “terrorists” or “traitors”.
Moreover, recent decrees, like the one issued in November 2023, allow the regime to confiscate the assets of those who oppose it, further disincentivising any potential return.
A UNHCR report from 2023 showed that less than 1.1% of Syrian refugees expressed a willingness to return to Syria under current conditions. They demand security, freedom from arbitrary detention, access to livelihoods, and the resolution of issues surrounding detainees—all things that the al-Assad regime has shown no interest in providing.
Any attempts to force or even encourage refugees to return to al-Assad-controlled areas will only lead to renewed cycles of displacement.
According to repeated surveys by the Syrian Association for Citizens Dignity, more than 70 % of displaced Syrians would rather risk their lives trying to reach Europe than accept a return to al-Assad-held Syria.
As a Bosnian, it makes me shudder to hear well-informed insiders warn that one of the central proposals championed by a number of European and some non-European states and international organisations is the creation of “safe zones” within al-Assad-held Syria where Syrian refugees would be returned to.
On paper, this may seem like a practical solution to Europe’s concerns over migration. However, in reality, the concept of safe zones in al-Assad-controlled areas is a dangerous illusion.
In Bosnia, we experienced first-hand how the concept of safe zones can fail catastrophically. The international community declared Srebrenica a safe zone, only to watch in horror as 8,000 men and boys were massacred by Bosnian Serb forces.
The failure of the international community to protect those who sought refuge there should serve as a permanent lesson in the limitations of such zones, especially when they are established in areas where the very forces responsible for war crimes are in control.
In Syria, the situation is even more complex. Al-Assad’s regime may nominally control large parts of the country, but key areas are actually under the influence of Iranian-backed militias and Hezbollah, as well as Russian forces. These are not regions of stability or safety; they are militarised zones where civilians continue to live in fear.
Violence, arbitrary arrests, and detentions remain widespread in al-Assad-controlled areas, making the idea of establishing safe zones within these territories not only unrealistic but also unethical. Any attempt to push refugees into these zones would place them directly into the hands of a regime that considers them traitors and enemies.
Furthermore, in areas like Daraa, which have nominally “reconciled” with the regime, the violence has never stopped, in fact it is on the rise. Residents continue to face threats, repression, and new waves of displacement.
Refugees who return to these areas are not returning to safety—they are returning to insecurity, intimidation, and the potential for renewed violence. This rise in violence is these days spreading to other areas, including Homs and Sweyda.
The experience of Daraa, where the head of the Military Security Branch of the regime’s forces only last week threatened to turn the town into a “Gaza like situation,” should serve as a stark warning to Europe about the dangers of relying on al-Assad to ensure security for returning refugees.
Forcing refugees back into al-Assad-controlled areas under the guise of “safe zones” would not only violate their basic human rights but would also lead to new waves of displacement. Many Syrians would choose to flee again rather than live under al-Assad’s brutal rule.
As a result, Europe could face renewed refugee flows, this time from Syrians who have been pushed back into an unsafe homeland. This scenario would only exacerbate the refugee crisis that European leaders are so eager to solve.
Normalising relations with al-Assad would have far-reaching consequences, not just for Syria but for Europe itself. Al-Assad has shown no interest in meaningful political reform, accountability for war crimes, or human rights. Instead, he has relied on the support of Iran and Russia to maintain his grip on power while continuing to oppress his people.
The push to normalise relations with al-Assad is not just misguided—it is dangerous. Proponents argue that normalisation would bring stability to Syria and allow for economic recovery. But this argument ignores the fundamental nature of al-Assad’s regime.
Al-Assad has not survived because he is a capable leader committed to the welfare of his people. He has survived because he has ruthlessly crushed any opposition, starved his people into submission, based his economy on the manufacturing and smuggling Captagon, and relied on external actors — namely Russia and Iran — to prop up his regime.
Normalising relations with al-Assad would not bring stability; it would entrench a corrupt, brutal dictatorship. The al-Assad regime has systematically weaponised humanitarian aid, diverting it to loyalists and using it to further its military objectives. The regime has no interest in political reform or national reconciliation.
Some 13 years of international engagement, from the “Four Baskets” to the Constitutional Committee to “Step for Step” to Arab normalisation, have all yielded the same result: al-Assad has refused to make any concessions. He has no reason to change course now.
For Europe, normalising al-Assad would be a political and moral disaster. It would send a clear message that dictators can commit war crimes, displace half their population, and still be welcomed back into the international community. This would not only embolden al-Assad but also set a dangerous precedent for other authoritarian regimes.
So, what should Europe’s strategy toward Syria look like? First, Europe must maintain its commitment to sanctions and diplomatic isolation of the al-Assad regime until there are real, verifiable changes on the ground.
These changes should include the release of political prisoners, an end to arbitrary arrests and torture, and the establishment of conditions for the safe, voluntary, and dignified return of refugees. Any discussions of reconstruction aid should be tied to progress on human rights and accountability for war crimes.
Second, Europe must continue to support the work of international organisations that are documenting war crimes and building cases for future prosecutions. Just as the ICTY was essential in holding perpetrators accountable in the Balkans, future justice mechanisms will be crucial for Syria. The issues of detainees and accountability for crimes continue to be the most important return conditions for the vast majority of displaced Syrians.
Finally, Europe must reject the idea of creating “safe zones” in al-Assad-controlled areas and focus instead on supporting refugees where they are. This means increasing support for host countries like Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan while at the same time using its political weight to elevate the creation of a genuinely safe environment for all Syrians to the top of the political process in Geneva.
There is one point Tajani, Schallenberg and I agree on: Europe indeed faces a critical choice in its approach to Syria.
It can either opt for the normalization of the Syrian regime and the creation of “safe zones” in al-Assad’s Syria and start preparing for new waves of Syrian refugees that are bound to seek safety in Europe as a result, or it can stand firm in its commitment to human rights, justice, and accountability, and start the hard work of convening a genuine political process which will move Syria towards the establishment of a genuinely safe environment for all Syrians.
Only one of these two paths is not only a moral obligation to the millions of displaced Syrians but also in Europe’s interest.
Refik Hodžić is a transitional justice expert, former ICTY spokesperson and former Communications Director of the International Center for Transitional Justice.
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